Ultra (UOS): The 8-Year Quest to Dethrone Steam – And Nothing to Show For It
By BCGamer —
Tags: ultra, uos
Look, I want to like Ultra. The vision is solid. A blockchain-based Steam competitor where you actually own your games, can resell them, and developers get a fairer cut. Partnerships with Ubisoft and AMD. Real games from real publishers.
On paper? This should work.
In reality? Eight years of development, $24+ million raised, partnerships with gaming giants... and they won't even tell you how many people use the platform.
Let me explain what went wrong with the "Netflix of Gaming."
What Ultra Actually Is
Ultra is a PC game distribution platform built on blockchain. Think Steam, but with:
Games as NFTs you can resell
Zero gas fee transactions
Better revenue split for developers (vs Steam's 30% cut)
NFT marketplace for in-game items
Esports platform (Ultra Arena)
Referral rewards for bringing friends
Founded in 2017 by David Hanson and Nicolas Gilot – both gaming industry veterans who previously worked on a $100M+ console project with AMD that got acquired by Xiaomi. They know the industry.
The blockchain runs on customized EOSIO tech with 12,000 TPS and instant transactions. The Ultra Games store launched publicly in April 2023 after years of beta testing.
The Partnerships (Actually Impressive)
I'll give Ultra credit here. These aren't vaporware partnerships:
Ubisoft – One of the world's biggest game publishers serves as a Corporate Block Producer on Ultra's network. That's real technical validation.
AMD – Multi-year co-marketing partnership with the chip giant.
Atari – Classic games available on the platform (Asteroids, Centipede, Pong, RollerCoaster Tycoon).
Thomson Computing – Ultra pre-installed on all Thomson laptops. That's distribution.
Publishers – Nacon, Microids, Plug In Digital, Skybound, Graffiti Games, Fulqrum. Real companies with real games.
The game catalog includes actual titles worth playing: Ubisoft's Champions Tactics (their Web3 tactical game), Blocklords (medieval strategy also on Epic/Steam), Phantom Galaxies, Medieval Empires, Forgive Me Father, plus Web3-native titles like Katana Inu and Cosmik Battle. Not just obscure stuff – there's real content here.
The Token Story
UOS launched via IEO on Bitfinex in July 2019 at $0.05. It pumped during the 2021 bull run to an all-time high of roughly $2.33-$2.49 in November 2021.
Then it did what every gaming token does. Crashed.
Current price? Around $0.008-0.01. That's a 99%+ decline from ATH.
Market cap sits at roughly $4-5 million. For context, that's smaller than most meme coins. A project with Ubisoft and AMD partnerships trading at a $5M valuation tells you everything about market sentiment.
Max supply is 1 billion tokens, with roughly 480-500 million circulating.
The Problem: Where Are The Users?
Here's where Ultra's story gets uncomfortable.
After 8 years of development, major partnerships, real game catalog, and over $24 million raised...
Ultra doesn't publicly share user numbers.
Think about that. Ubisoft partnership. AMD co-marketing deal. Pre-installed on Thomson laptops. Real publishers. Real games. And they won't tell you how many people actually use the platform.
For comparison: Steam has 132 million monthly active users and 239,000+ games. Epic Games Store has 160+ million users. Even failed platforms usually share numbers when they're trying to grow.
The beta test in 2023 had "more than 1,000 players from around the world." Some third-party analysis suggests active wallet counts in the low thousands. But Ultra itself stays silent.
When a project with this much backing and runway doesn't share adoption metrics, it usually means the numbers aren't flattering.
What Went Wrong
The chicken-and-egg problem (partially solved). Ultra now has games – real ones, including from Ubisoft. But gamers still need a reason to switch from Steam. Having games is necessary but not sufficient.
Nobody asked for this. Most gamers don't care about reselling digital games. They don't care about NFT ownership. They care about playing games with their friends who are already on Steam.
Feature gap. Friends lists and chat are on Ultra's 2025 roadmap. Steam has had these features for 20 years. You can't compete with a platform when you're two decades behind on basic social features.
Exclusives taking too long. Ultra has been teasing AAA exclusive games for years. Project Citadel (an FPS) and an exclusive sports game were announced but still haven't launched. Champions Tactics from Ubisoft is live, which is a win, but the "Fortnite moment" that would drive mass adoption hasn't happened yet.
Staking delays. UOS staking was promised for 2024. As of late 2025, still not launched. Pattern of overpromising, underdelivering.
Recent Developments (2025)
Ultra raised another $12 million in April 2025 and brought in a new CEO, Gus van Rijckevorsel. The messaging shifted to "Netflix of Gaming" and focusing on European market expansion.
New roadmap includes:
Game store redesign
Social features (friends, chat)
UOS staking (finally)
$1M developer grants program
Acquiring "distressed gaming companies"
Web marketplace (no client download required)
In March 2025, they deployed Ultra EVM for Ethereum compatibility. In September 2025, MEXC flagged UOS for potential delisting due to compliance concerns. Mixed signals.
What Ultra Gets Right
The tech works. Zero gas fees, fast transactions, functional marketplace. No complaints there.
Real partnerships. Ubisoft and AMD aren't signing deals with scams. There's legitimate industry validation here.
Hybrid approach. You can pay with credit card or crypto. Games priced in USD, converted to UOS at checkout. Smart way to reduce friction.
Game reselling concept. The idea of a secondhand digital games market is genuinely interesting. If it ever gets adoption.
Play-and-earn over play-to-earn. No paywall to start playing. Correct philosophy.
What Ultra Gets Wrong
8 years is too long. At some point, you either have product-market fit or you don't. Refusing to share user numbers after 8 years suggests the market has spoken.
Competing with Steam is borderline impossible. Network effects are brutal. Everyone's friends are on Steam. Everyone's game library is on Steam. Switching costs are enormous.
Web3 gaming stigma. Gamers actively hate NFTs and blockchain gaming. Ultra has to overcome that hostility while also competing with established platforms. Double handicap.
Exchange risks. MEXC delisting warning adds uncertainty. Liquidity could become a problem.
The Current State (January 2026)
Let's be honest about where Ultra stands:
Token Price: ~$0.008-0.01 (99%+ down from ATH)
Market Cap: ~$4-5 million
Total Raised: $24+ million
Years in Development: 8
Major Partnerships: Ubisoft, AMD, Atari, Thomson
Active Users: Not disclosed (red flag)
Steam's Monthly Users: 132 million
The infrastructure exists. The partnerships exist. The games exist. Official user numbers? Suspiciously absent.
Does Ultra Have Potential?
Honestly? More than most projects in this space.
A blockchain gaming platform backed by Ubisoft and AMD, with legitimate publisher relationships, real games you can play right now, and working infrastructure. That's not nothing – that's more than 95% of Web3 gaming projects can claim.
The issue is adoption, not product. And adoption is the hardest problem to solve.
The new funding and leadership suggest they're making another push. The game catalog is growing. Champions Tactics from Ubisoft is live. Whether that translates to users switching from Steam remains to be seen.
Should You Buy UOS?
Bull case: Massively undervalued if Ultra ever achieves adoption. $4-5M market cap for a project with Ubisoft/AMD backing and real games. If the "Netflix of Gaming" vision clicks, early holders win big. New CEO, fresh funding, European expansion strategy.
Bear case: 8 years, $24M+, Ubisoft partnership, AMD backing – and they won't share user numbers. The market has had nearly a decade to adopt this platform. MEXC delisting concerns. Competing with Steam is likely impossible. Token down 99% and could keep falling.
My take: Ultra is the poster child for "good idea, no adoption." Everything looks right on paper. Experienced team. Real partnerships. Working tech. Solid vision.
But when a project with this pedigree refuses to share user metrics after 8 years, it tells you what you need to know. At some point, you have to accept that no amount of funding or partnerships can force adoption.
At current prices, you're basically buying a lottery ticket on Ultra somehow cracking the code that's eluded them for nearly a decade. Could happen. Probably won't.
The Bottom Line
Ultra has actually built something real. The platform works. The games exist – including a Ubisoft title. The tech is solid.
The question isn't "did they ship?" anymore. They shipped.
The question is: can they get users to care? After 8 years, with Steam's network effects, with gamers actively hostile to NFTs and blockchain... can Ultra convince people to switch?
The vision of a blockchain Steam competitor isn't wrong. Game ownership, reselling, fair developer cuts – these are real problems worth solving. But Ultra still hasn't proven the market wants this solution.
Steam's network effects might simply be unbreakable. Or maybe Ultra's moment is coming with the next crypto cycle. Eight years is a long time to wait, but they're still building.
At $4-5M market cap, the market has essentially written Ultra off. They're either spectacularly undervalued for what they've built, or correctly priced for a project that can't convert good tech into adoption.
That's the honest assessment.
This is not financial advice. Always DYOR.